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Abstract: We examine the role of democracy shocks in the cross-country economic growth processes
over a period of five decades since 1960. The recent uprisings that arose independently and spread
across the Arab world form the main context of our investigation. We study if (i) a shock to
democracy in one country triggers institutional reforms and growth upsurge in the neighbouring
countries, and (ii) the magnitude and direction of response to democracy shocks are contingent
upon income pathways of countries. To estimate the spillover effects of democracy shocks, we
model and estimate growth interdependence among individual countries with similar democratic
characteristics. To study the nature of responses of democracy shocks on cross-country growth
processes, we build and estimate a Global Vector Autoregression (GVAR) model where we allow
countries to be interdependent with regard to bilateral migration and geographical proximity. Using
the GVAR model, we also stimulate a positive shock to democracy in Egypt—the most populous
Arabic country—and study its impacts on institutional reforms and economic growth in the rest of
the Arab World. We find that high and upper-middle income countries are immune to democracy
shocks in Egypt, whereas the lower middle and low income countries are susceptible to another
revolutionary wave.
Keywords: democracy shocks; Arab Spring; spatial growth interdependence; Global VAR; democracy;
revolutionary wave
JEL Classification: B52; C22; C23; E02; F59; O24; O40; R11
1. Introduction
In the context of a nation’s political-economic dynamics, the state of democracy often masks
the spatio-temporal impacts of democratic quality it might experience from the neighbourhood.
Surprisingly, this hidden effect is not rigorously modelled or robustly evidenced empirically
possibly because, in the conventional empirical approach, dynamic interdependence among countries’
political-economic processes is assumed but not explicitly modelled. Within the conventional
estimation paradigm, Acemoglu et al. (2014) show that democracy exerts positive effects on
cross-country economic growth of both developed and developing countries. However, such effects
can also be inherently spatial in nature as economies which are tightly interlinked by geography, trade,
migration, and socio-cultural parameters are bound to experience some degree of spillover effects of a
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decision taken elsewhere in the ’neighbourhood’1. The study by Diebolt et al. (2013) is a prominent
example in this regard, where the authors show that countries which are close to each other with
respect to similarity in democratic characteristics demonstrate highly interdependent growth processes.
While in these and related studies, spatial spillover effects of democracy on growth are estimated,
the nascent literature has offered insufficient evidence till date on how democratic quality in one
country could trigger similar process in the neighbourhood and in turn, would determine the growth
processes of these countries. A recent historic political episode related to the sequence of events in
the Arab Spring has indeed triggered new questions on democracy-growth relationship, especially
on how democracy shocks might affect neighbouring economies’ democratic and (interdependent)
growth processes. A shock needs a medium to migrate and leave a permanent or transitory impact
on the system. In the context of our work, this medium can be envisaged in the form of the degree of
economic development. Accordingly, there are two broad research questions this paper aims to address:
First, does a shock to democracy in one country trigger institutional reforms and growth upsurge in
the neighbouring countries? Second, is the nature of response to democracy shocks conditional on
countries income pathways? To investigate this further, we study the case of the Arab Spring and
employ a Global Vector Autoregression (GVAR) model to quantify its effects.
To the best of our knowledge, the research we have undertaken in this paper is among the few
such attempts which address both spillover effects of democracy shocks and the dynamics of causality
and cointegration within a systematic framework. We aim to contribute to the literature in three
significant ways. First, we investigate how a proximity effect of democracy motivates continuous
growth and democracy spillovers in the neighbouring economies. Following the momentous historical
developments in the Arab Spring, this is particularly a pertinent query. Second, we study how
countries, characterised by their development status, are going to respond to institutional shocks
occurring in the neighbourhood? Are countries, which are persistently autocratic, or have experienced
democratic/autocratic reversals, going to respond to democracy shocks in a neighbouring economy?
Will the size of the economy, where democracy shocks are originating, determine the magnitude of
growth and democratic effects in the neighbourhood (that is, interconnected strongly by geographic
distance and social dynamics)? Third, we construct a ‘democratic distance’ metric among countries
to study spillover effects of economic growth. A spatially interdependent growth model is then
estimated by employing spatial vector autoregressive approach where a first hand analysis of the effect
of ‘proximity’ in democratic sense is quantified on dynamic complementarity of Arab countries growth
processes. This result is used as a foundation to undertake a rigorous GVAR analysis that helps to
explain the way democracy shocks in one country may affect its neighbours in a ‘global’ context (i.e.,
the contagion as well as dynamic effects of democracy on the cross-country interdependent system).
We adopt a unique approach to study democracy-economic growth relationships by explicitly
linking countries by their geographical and economic ’proximity’. For the latter, we use bilateral
migration as a measure of economic distance. In particular, we exploit the properties of the GVAR
model to simulate the effect of democracy shocks in a panel of nineteen Arabic countries. Towards this
end, we are motivated by a number of recent studies where GVAR framework has been employed
to model spillover effects; see for instance, Cakir and Kabundi (2013) and Koukouritakis et al. (2015).
Using this framework, we simulate the effects of the shocks to selected variables in the system and
report the impacts they may have on other variables over time. In doing so, we attempt to answer the
question whether Egypt can be a motivating force of democratisation to other Arab countries.2
The rest of the paper is planned as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature. Section 3
offers an overview of the democratic challenges in the Arab World. Section 4 presents the dataset. In
1 ’Space’ in this case can be defined in both geographic and relational sense.
2 One could further incorporate other countries from developed and developing regions to lend robustness of our empirical
results. However, such an analysis while could be intuitive, it can be contested on the ground that democratic spillover
effects are more acutely felt among neighbouring regions.
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Section 5 we present some preliminary empirical observations leading to the estimation of the GVAR
model, the methodology which is described in Section 6. The main empirical results are presented in
Section 7. Finally, Section 8 provides robustness checks and Section 9 summarises the main findings of
the paper.
2. Synoptic View of the Literature
A number of influential studies show that democracy has positive effects on economic growth.
Among recent work, Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), Yang (2011),
and Acemoglu et al. (2014) are some of the leading examples in this regard. Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005)
argue that democratic economies have better adaptive capabilities against adverse shocks. Knutsen
(2012) finds robust empirical support in that democracies produce higher economic growth than
autocracies via improved technical change. Similarly, Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), and Yang
(2011) also reflect on the growth enhancing effect of the process of democratisation. Among sceptics,
Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) study the channels through which democracy influences growth, and
show that democracies are associated with low levels of private investment and high government
spending, which in turn retards economic success. However, the weight of evidence in favour
of the significant positive effects of democracy seems to have outweighed the evidence in favour
of its negative effects. At the same time, Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), among others, also
demonstrate that the timing of democratisation is important towards understanding if democracy will
have persistently positive/negative effects on economic growth.
Moreover, a body of literature has increasingly stressed that democracy not only exerts positive
effects on growth but such effects are spatial in nature (see among others, O’Loughlin et al. (1998),
Murdoch and Sandler (2002), Diebolt et al. (2013)). O’Loughlin et al. (1998) present a theoretical
model and accompanying computer simulation that explain the diffusion process of democracy
based on the dynamics of public opinion and mass revolutions.3 Building on a democratic distance
function and employing a spatial vector autoregression mechanism, Diebolt et al. (2013) estimate the
magnitudes of dynamic complementarity in countries’ growth processes as a function of democratic
distance. A few studies have used political institutions in neighbouring countries as an instrumental
variable for political institutions in a country under investigation. For example, using a sample of 141
countries, Madsen et al. (2015) use linguistic distance-weighted foreign democracy as an instrument for
domestic democracy. These and similar studies, thus establish an important point in democracy-growth
relationship: Both democratisation and the democratic stock in one country can trigger dynamic spatial
spillover effects in countries with spatial proximity.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no such study that addresses both cross-country
spillover of institutional shocks and its dynamics, especially in the Arab World. As such, we utilise
the Arab Spring to complement the current literature by investigating how countries respond to
institutional shocks occurring in the neighbourhood. Elkink (2011) and O’Loughlin et al. (1998)
provide some analysis of democracy diffusion in the international context. The models employed in
these studies offer some theoretical insights of the effect of democratic diffusion (Elkink 2011) and
the role of geography in the analysis of spatial effects of democracy (O’Loughlin et al. (1998)). In
these and in the literature that followed (e.g., Diebolt et al. (2013)) spatial and temporal aspects of
democratic diffusion in the world system has been analysed. Schwarz (2008) provides useful insights
into state-formation, and highlights where Arab states are strong (security function and in times of oil
booms, welfare function) and where they are weak (representation function, and in times of fiscal crisis,
welfare function). Following these and related literature, it is not possible to answer, how a proximity
3 Indeed, following O’Loughlin et al. (1998), the diffusion of attitudes, in combination with a cascading model of revolutions,
is a possible theoretical source of explanation of the spatial spillover clustering democracy. The implications of these
theoretical predictions can be far reaching with respect to both evolution of political economy and social restructuring in the
long run.
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effect of democracy can motivate a persistent growth and democratic spillovers in neighbouring
countries. In view of the events in the Arab Spring, this is particularly a pertinent query, which we
would make an attempt to address using alternate methodological framework.
From a political economic perspective, it is important to study democratisation in Arab countries
and how it may proceed differently than it has in other regions, due to political cultures, in particular
the role of Islam in politics and the important role of oil in some of the regions’ economies. A variety
of theories investigate (the impact of) the lack of democracy in the Arab world. These explanations can
be grouped into four categories: (i) pertaining to cultural perquisites for democracy; (ii) Arab world’s
location; (iii) foreign involvement; and, finally, (iv) importance of government agency (either with
regard to the institutions the governments create or the strategies they employ (Miller et al. 2012)).
However, the most prevalent explanation for the Arab world’s lack of democracy is the presence of oil
(Stevens 2011). In addition, when statistically tested, the relationship between Islam and democracy
shows that Muslim-majority countries are less likely to be democratic than non-Muslim majority
countries (see, for example, Potrafke (2012, 2013)). Nevertheless, we do not aim to explore the reasons
for the lack of democracy in these countries. Instead, we focus our primary objective on whether a
shock to democracy in Egypt could motivate an uprising of similar events in the region, and how the
possibility of such effects might impact the dynamics of growth interdependence in the region.
3. Democratic Challenges and Growth among the Arab Economies
3.1. Background
What is happening in Arab Spring countries now raises many questions and captures the world’s
attention. The Egyptian revolution, following on the Tunisian uprising, has sent shock waves across the
Arab world, and has inspired a new political awareness in other Arab countries that might motivate a
regime change. Jordan, for example, is a prime candidate to follow the Egyptian road. The country
faced a rising unemployment rate and growing poverty. Yemen, with 45% of the population living on
less than 2 dollars a day, may have followed the same revolutionary movement. Algeria also saw recent
protest and movements against the rising cost of basic food. Several governments have responded
to more limited protest and movements with promises of political and constitutional reform. Such
processes are under way in Morocco and Oman. A group of economically powerful Gulf states—Saudi
Arabia, the UAE and Qatar—remain resolutely opposed to fundamental reforms, including the
introduction of representative democracy. Saudi Arabia has sought to pre-empt pro-democracy protests
by announcing a massive programme of state investment, in an attempt to address grievances about
high rates of unemployment and the lack of affordable housing. It is also playing an important role in
countering the pro-democracy trend, most conspicuously through its military intervention in Bahrain.
This raises the question of whether the Arab world might experience a wave of democratisation sooner
or latter, as in eastern Europe after 1989. If democracy deepens in Tunisia and Egypt, other countries
in the Arab world will have the opportunity to learn from their example.
Although there are growing literature4 on the likely effects of democratisation on states’ economic
and social structure, relatively few empirical studies raise questions on whether recent democratisation
in Egypt and Tunisia will unfold in similar way to the other Arab countries. If being (oil) rich is
a prohibitive limit to the path of democratisation, an interesting question then is to ask: does the
presence of oil really have antidemocratic effect? Miller et al. (2012) consider the challenges ahead for
Egypt and Tunisia and offer some lessons from past transition experiences. Their case studies provide
insightful evidence that no threshold of economic development is required for democratisation. This is
also reflected in the work of Przeworski (2004). Moreover, the claim that oil and democracy do not
4 Jeffrey (2007), for instance, uses comparative analysis of Bosnia and Iraq to explore how fraught moral and political questions
prompt by contemporary practices of state building.
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mix is used by many scholars to explain why the high income states of the Arab Middle East have
not become democratic. Studies on Algeria, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf states have all suggested that the
government’s oil wealth has blocked a transition to democracy (Huntington (1993)).5
3.2. Arab Economies and the Democratic Challenges
The background discussion above provides an indication of possible interconnectedness between
democracy and economic growth in Arab countries. In fact, scholars have argued that Arab world
has never had a consolidated democracy within its ranks. It does include a few examples of hybrid
regimes and in the literature these regimes have been referred to as competitive authoritarian, electoral
authoritarian, and partly free, among other labels. Three hybrid regimes in the Arab world- Lebanon,
Kuwait, and Iraq- are often referred to as democratising regimes. However, each of these countries
faces considerable obstacles to evolving into stable democratic systems. Beyond the Arab world’s
hybrid regimes, which operate within constitutional systems that have some features of democracy,
the region contains a wide variety of more purely authoritarian regimes. Of these, there are seven
monarchies- Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Morocco, Jordan, and Oman-
and, prior to the Arab Spring, there were six republics headed by long-ruling autocrats- Syria, Yemen,
Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. Of the republics, as of early 2012, Tunisia was a nascent electoral
democracy still in a transitional phase; Egypt had held parliamentary elections but was experiencing
a more uncertain transition than Tunisia; autocratic leaders had been removed in Libya (violently)
and Yemen (through negotiation), but transition processes had barely begun (Miller et al. 2012).
Therefore, there are two regimes types in the Arab world that are thought to be particularly resistant
to democratisation: dynastic monarchies and personalised regimes. In addition, Arab leaders have
dampened enthusiasm for democracy by pitting regime opponents against each other, so that each
prefers maintaining the current leadership to the possibility of their rival coming to power. Current
regimes also have employed highly effective strategies for managing opposition and reducing pressure
for meaningful political change.
As regional revolutions in Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Bahrain have yet to see their results, we
consider Tunisia and Egypt as better placed to the process of democratisation. However, we mainly
focus on Egypt given its sizeable population in the Arab world (nearly one third of the Arab population).
Prior to the revolution, the economy in Egypt as a whole was performing better than ever. GDP growth
had shifted into a much higher gear. Although the growth rate under the regime of Mubarak pointed
to a healthy economy, this indicator masked the very real economic insecurity felt by many Egyptians.
The economic growth was accompanied by rising inequality that reached levels not seen before in
Egypt’s modern history (El-Shimy 2011). Egyptians also saw an erosion of their economic position
due to increases in inflation. Food prices rose 20% just in 2010 alone. Corruption reached an extreme,
with Egypt rated 80th in the world. The economic, political, and social reasons behind the Egypt
revolution were expressed by serious signs of discontent prior to the revolution taking place 6. In
addition, one politically explosive issue is the countries’ high unemployment rate among youth. There
is universal agreement that unemployment, in particular youth unemployment, and poverty played a
significant, if not the most important, role in the Arab Spring 7. Two-thirds of Egyptians are under 30,
and each year 700,000 new graduates chase 200,000 new jobs (Green 2011). Unofficial statistics mirror
an upward trend but paint an even graver picture, indicating figures twice as high as those derived
from government data.
5 Another angle considers that religious affiliation is closely linked with institutional quality. Pryor (2007) finds that Islam has
significantly negative impact on political rights. On the other hand, Toros (2010) concludes that democratic and religious
values coexist and there is only a limited connection between Islam and attitude to democracy in Turkey. Hence, the
experience of Turkey constitutes one example of how democratic values can take root and develop in a Muslim population.
6 In 2004 there were about 266 acts of protest; and by 2008 they reached 630.
7 In 2005, the youth unemployment rate in Egypt was 34% and 31% in Tunisia.
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4. Data
We use annual data for nineteen Arab countries spanning over the period of 1960–20128. For our
purpose, we group countries in the GVAR model according to their income levels, viz., high, upper
middle, lower middle and low income countries (see Table 1). The variables used in the individual
country models include an index for democracy, economic development, human capital stock and
trade openness. In addition, to construct the methodology, we use oil prices, bilateral migration and
geographical distance. Data are extracted from the World Bank’s WDI database unless stated otherwise.
Economic development is measured as the real GDP per capita at 2001 international purchasing power
parity. Human capital stock is measured as the average years of schooling in the total population of
age 15 and above, given by Barro and Lee (2013).9 Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports
as a share of GDP.
The annual series for oil prices are computed based on the average daily closing prices obtained
for all trading days within the year. This is a Brent crude oil price in the basis of free on board (F.O.B.)
in terms US $/Barrel. Data are collected from DataStream (Ticker: WDOCBRNT).
Table 1. Dataset country classification according to income level.
High Income Upper Middle Lower Middle Low Income
Bahrain Algeria Djibouti Comoros
Kuwait Jordan Iraq Mauritania
Oman Lebanon Morocco Somalia
Saudi Arabia Libya Sudan
Tunisia Egypt *
Yemen
Note: Country income classification is based on the World Bank 2012 definition. It divided countries according
to their 2011 per capita GNI as follows: low income ($1025 or less); lower middle income ($1026–4035); upper
middle income ($4036–12,475); and high income ($12,476 or more). * denotes the reference country in the
GVAR model.
To proxy for democracy (i.e., institutional quality), we use the Polity IV database provided by
Marshal et al. (2012). More particularly, we use the polity2 index which is based on subscores for
constraints on the chief executive, the competitiveness of political participation, and the openness
and competitiveness of executive recruitment. The polity2 score ranges from −10 to 10 with higher
values denoting more democratic institutions. However, when grouping countries according to their
income level in the GVAR model, we transform the polity2 into a 0–10 index to avoid negative values
cancelling out positive values as well as to ease the interpretation of the impulse response functions.
5. Preliminary Observations
We present some stylised facts which otherwise characterise the inter-linkage between the process
of democratisation and income growth conditional on institutional settings.
8 To avoid possible distortions caused by the Egyptian military coup in 2013, we chose to limit our dataset to 2012. Yet, we
exploit the environment of the Egyptian uprising to motivate for our study without necessarily modelling a particular event.
Like is the case with all VAR models, we use information the data provides to learn about what is most likely to happen in a
given situation (e.g., a positive shock to democracy in Egypt). We ask what if democracy succeeds in Egypt, how this is
expected to affect the rest of the Arab World. Perhaps the large amount of grants and development aid provided by the
oil-rich Arab states following the fall of the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood regime well explain the impact
that democracy in Egypt could have in the region. In fact, authoritarians in the Arab World are not expected to support the
success of democracy in Egypt. In addition, although adding observations may improve the efficiency of the estimation,
we strongly believe that we have a sufficient number of time series observations to warrant sensible econometric results.
Therefore, we believe it is sensible to consider 2012 as the endpoint in our dataset. Yet, it is possible for future research to
extend our dataset to explore whether or not changes after 2012 confirm our findings.
9 This dataset on schooling is calculated based a five year basis, which we smoothed to obtain the annual data series.
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5.1. Observation 1: Non-Unique Democratisation Episodes and Transition Probability
Following Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), we construct various democratisation episodes
and regime changes among countries. Table A1, in the Appendix A, presents the democratisation event
chronology among nineteen Arab countries. The event chronology reveals a heterogeneous pattern of
democratisation: the number of countries with ‘transition to democracy’ event is far smaller than the
one with ‘transition to autocracy’. Transition to democracy is also not very strong and one of them is in
the borderline (for instance, Comoros in 1990). The only persistent effect is the persistence of autocracy
and/or regime change with fairly weak persistence in transition to democracy. In Table A2, the results
are qualified by Markovian transition probability matrix. As is evident, among all countries, on the
average, the transition between democratic states is fairly large (often around 90%) implying that there
is a strong persistence of previous period democratic state. In the Table, except for a few, majority of
the countries are characterised by transition to autocracy and therefore, the high transition probability
among two similar values of democracy (e.g., between 10,−10 and so forth) imply no major reversal
of democratic trend.
5.2. Observation 2: Spatial Dynamic Interdependence
We also present a brief analysis of dynamic spatial interdependence among countries’ growth
processes where ’space’ is defined in an ‘economic’ or ’relational’ sense as in (Diebolt et al. (2013)). Since,
our primary interest is to study the diffusion of democratic shocks and estimating their responsiveness
conditional on the countries’ development pathways, it is necessary thus to understand—as and
when economic distance among countries rise—how do their growth processes respond in terms of
complementarity and interdependence. Following Diebolt et al. (2013), we can define ‘democratic
distance’ as a measure of distance among countries with respect to democratisation and oil price shocks.
It is expected that if countries’ growth processes are highly interdependent (that is, with dynamic
spillovers as function of this distance is greater than zero), then a democratic shock would negatively
affect countries in the ‘neighbourhood’ during early stages of growth, but would be instrumental
in facilitating a stable and higher growth in the long-run. As in Diebolt et al. (2013), we present the
spatio-temporal framework of growth interdependence among Arab countries as:
Yi,t+1 = αiYi,t +
N
∑
j 6=i
fi(Dt(i, j))Yj,t + γ(Dt(i, j))Xi,t + e(Dt(i, j)) (1)
where for country i (i = 1, ..., N), {Yt−l , Dt−l , l ≥ 0}, is history of the output per capita growth. Using
a cardinal B-Spline, the authors estimated the parameters related to f function (that is, fi(Dt(i, j))Yj,t)
where the functional relation was left open in order to uncover true functional form. Dt(i, j) is a
distance matrix, the elements of which concern democratic distance of a country from its neighbour.
We estimated the spatial interdependence coefficient of economic growth among Arab countries as a
function of the democratic distance measure. The results from estimating Equation (1) are presented in
Table 2 and Figure 1, where αˆ is the estimated dynamic spatial VAR coefficient and σˆ2 is the dynamic
spatial error covariance matrix. Both are expressed and estimated as functions of democratisation
distance. The spatial VAR coefficient for each country represents interesting patterns. Positive dynamic
spatial VAR coefficients are noted for Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, and Sudan, for instance, whereas
large negative spatial VAR coefficients are estimated for Djibouti and Morocco. We found the error
covariance to evince a monotonic decay with increasing distance, indicating good model fit.
The evidence of large negative and positive spatial VAR coefficients indicate that democratic
shocks would affect dynamics of interdependence and complementarity among countries’ growth
pathways over time. The spatial diffusion of democracy and its effects on growth are important in that
a strategy of cooperative policy programs to improve democratic quality in neighbouring countries
can be pareto improving in terms of long-term welfare of both the individual and all countries taken
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together. To understand how democratic shocks affect the causality and direction of effects within a
systemic framework, we present next the GVAR model and its corresponding results.
Table 2. Features of spatial growth interdependence.
αˆ σˆ2
Algeria 0.1239 0.0072
Bahrain 0.0756 0.0071
Comoros −0.2110 0.0021
Djibouti −0.4673 0.0104
Egypt 0.1701 0.0003
Iraq −0.1227 0.0664
Jordan 0.3531 0.0045
Kuwait −0.1590 0.0328
Lebanon −0.1082 0.0633
Libya 0.0007 0.0141
Mauritania 0.0416 0.0010
Morocco −0.2305 0.0003
Oman 0.0663 0.0250
Saudi Arabia −0.1916 0.0195
Somalia −0.1979 0.0070
Sudan 0.1948 0.0051
Tunisia −0.0887 0.0000
Note: αˆ & σˆ2 denote dynamic spatial autocorrelation and dynamic spatial error covariance.
Dynamic spatial interdependence of growth Dynamic spatial interdependence of error-covariance
Figure 1. Spatial Vector Autoregression results: (i) growth interdependence as a function of democratic
distance (left panel), (ii) error variance-covariance matrix as a function of democratic distance
(right panel).
6. Model and Estimation
In the previous section, we presented two key observations pointing to the fact that both
democracy and democratisation are instrumental in realizing positive and interdependent growth
processes among Arab countries. A natural question that may arise now is how democratic shocks in
one country affect growth and institutional pattern in proximus countries (defined in both geographic
and relational sense). Characterisation of democratic shocks transmission mechanism for the Arab
World is therefore necessary to shed important insights into the future of growth interdependence
and institutional changes in these countries. Using the GVAR mechanism developed by Pesaran et al.
(2004) and Pesaran and Smith (2006), the current paper investigates the transmission of democratic
shocks originated in Egypt and its propagation mechanism to the Arab world countries.
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6.1. Country Specific Models
Consider N + 1 countries in the global economy, indexed by i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N, where N = 18 and
country i = 0 serves as a reference country. For each country i a VARX∗(pi, qi) model, where pi and qi
are the lag orders of the domestic and foreign variables, can be presented as follows:
xit = ai0 + ai1t +Φi1xi,t−1 + ... +Φipi xi,t−pi +Λi0x
∗
it +Λi1x
∗
i,t−1 + ... +Λiqi x
∗
i,t−qi + uit (2)
where t = 1, 2, ..., T, xit is a ki × 1 vector of domestic variables belonging to country i, at time t, x∗it is a
k∗i × 1 vector of country i specific foreign variables, ai0 is a ki × 1 vector of fixed intercept coefficients,
ai1 is a ki × 1 vector of coefficients of the deterministic time trend, Φi is a ki × ki matrix of coefficients
associated to lagged domestic variables, Λi0 and Λi1 are ki × k∗i matrices of coefficients related to
contemporaneous and lagged foreign variables respectively. The error term uit is a ki × 1 vector of
idiosyncratic, serially uncorrelated, country specific shocks, where uit ∼ i.i.d and have a zero mean
with a covariance matrix Σij. Country-specific foreign variables are constructed as cross-sectional
averages of the domestic variables using fixed weights wij. Countries in our GVAR model are linked
through a novel composite matrix that exploits information from countries bilateral migration and
geographical distance. Although the majority of the GVAR applications tend to use either trade or
financial, our weight matrix is based on bilateral migration and geographic distance to reflect possible
transmission mechanisms in the context of democracy shocks. Given the low level of economic
integration (with the exception of GCC countries), we believe that trade and financial linkages are not
the best proxy of how shocks to democracy in Egypt can transmit to other neighbouring countries. Our
proposed weight matrix, in contrast, implies that a country which have more Egyptian immigrants
and/or closer in geographical sense to Egypt is expected to be relatively more sensitive to institutional
shocks (reforms) in Egypt.
x∗it =
N
∑
j=0
wijxjt (3)
where j = 0, 1, ...N, wii = 0, and ∑Nj=0 wij = 1. x
∗
it is a vector of the foreign variables for country i in
time t and xjt is a vector of their endogenous counterparts in the whole system except for country i. wit
denotes the fixed-weights matrix of country i with country j, see Table A3 in the Appendix. In addition
to these foreign variables constructed as the sum weighted contributions of the N − 1 other countries,
the model contains unweighted oil prices (poil) as a global variable, which is weakly exogenous to all
countries in the system except Egypt’s model wherein poil enters as an endogenous variable. Thus,
the resulting GVAR model is no more than a VAR(p) model containing global endogenous variables.
To explicitly account for the long-run relationships in the country-specific VARX models in
Equation (2), this study considers the error correction representation VECMX of these models. To
combine the country-specific VARX∗(pi, qi) models into a global VAR model, firstly, the k× 1 vector of
the global variables is collected where k = ΣNi=0ki , xt = (x
′
0t, ..., x
′
Nt)
′ (i.e., collecting a vector of all the
endogenous variables of the system). Secondly, using the link matrices Wi(ki + k∗i )× k matrix based
on the fixed weights wij, the GVAR model can be presented as follows.
Ai0Wixt = ai0 + ai1t + Σ
p
j=1AijWixt−j + ut, (4)
for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., N.
It is straightforward to stack the country-specific VARX∗(pi, qi) models in Equation (4). It is worth
mentioning that all of the GVAR parameters are obtained for the country-specific models VARX∗(pi, qi)
and the transformation using the link matrices Wi.
In our GVAR model, the reference country is Egypt, given its populous size and influence within
the Arab World. Endogenous variables in individual country models are democracy index, real
GDP, openness and schooling. Additionally, foreign real GDP, foreign democracy index, openness of
other countries and foreign schooling are included as weakly exogenous variables into the system
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constructed based on a constant weights matrix. The global variable is the oil price, which is treated
weakly exogenous in all country specific models except Egypt (i.e., our reference country). Different
regions are constructed based on weighted averages of country models, for which we use a matrix
based on each country’s GDP contribution relative to the GDP of the whole region. After estimating
country specific VARX models, we stack these models.
7. Empirical Results
7.1. GVAR Diagnostic Tests
Firstly, we test for the integration order of the variables using the augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) unit root test. Table A4 presents ADF statistics of all the region-specific domestic variables,
whilst Table A5 includes the foreign variables. The results, support in general, the treatment of the
variables as being I(1). Secondly, we test for the order of the VARX models as well as the number of
cointegrating relationships. The results in Table A6 are based on the maximum eigenvalue and trace
statistics at the 5% significance level. As shown in Table A6, the models have two or one cointegrating
relationships. Thirdly, we test for the presence of serial correlation among the residuals. Table A7
reports the F-statistics for the serial correlation of the VECMX models along with the corresponding
critical values at 5% significance level. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.
Finally, the weak exogeneity of the foreign variables is an essential assumption for the GVAR set up.
This assumption implies that there is no long run feedback from the endogenous variables to the
foreign variables. Therefore, we conduct a formal test of the weak exogeneity assumption by testing
the joint significance of the estimated error correction terms in a set of auxiliary equations, wherein
foreign variables are made endogenous. If foreign variables are weakly exogenous, we expect the
estimated coefficients for the error correction terms not to be statistically significant. The results from
the exogeneity test are reported in Table A8. These results show that the foreign variables pass the
weak exogeneity test as we fail to reject the null hypothesis.
7.2. Dynamic Analysis
Using the generalised impulse response functions (GIRFs) from a GVAR(2) model we chart the
impact of a positive shock to democracy in Egypt on democracy and growth across the Arab world over
time. The results summarised below are based on the median estimates resulting from bootstrapping
the model (500 replications) considering 95% confidence intervals of the error bands. Figure 2 shows
response of democracy to a positive shock to the democracy index in Egypt while Figure 3 shows
growth responses to the same shock.
Referring to Figure 2, it seems that a 1 σ shock to the democracy index in Egypt has a statistically
significant impact on both low and lower-middle income countries 10. The Egyptian democratic
positive shock is more likely to induce democracy in those groups of countries by about 4% in low
income countries and about 2% in lower-middle income countries. To further explain what this means,
suppose that the 0–10 polity index increases by one sample standard deviation (σ) (equivalent to 0.08
point change in the polity index in our sample). Then, all else equal, the polity index is likely to increase
by 0.4 points in low income countries, and by 0.2 points in lower middle income countries. This effect
becomes profound and persists after four years around 1% and 0.6% in low and lower-middle income
countries, respectively. Interestingly, the same shock does not seem to have a statistically significant
10 It would have been very insightful had we been able to examine the effects of a full transition (i.e., dictatorship to democracy)
rather than only a 1 σ shock to democracy. Given the context of the Arab World which lacks examples of democracy, such
full transition scenario would not only overlook the context within which this study is applied but also is a very challenging
task. Moreover, we believe that democracy is rather a process that accumulates over time and might not happen as an over
night shock. Even though one can create a rough dichotomous measure of democracy (e.g., 0 and 1), Gründler and Krieger
(2016) argue that graded measures of democracy are superior to dichotomous classification.
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impact on democracy in both high and upper-middle income countries, which continues to be the case
over the entire range of the time horizon.
Moreover, we report the response of GDP growth processes within the Arab World to a simulated
‘improvement’ in institutional quality in Egypt. In particular, Figure 3 shows the GIRFs of GDP
resulting from a one standard deviation (1SD) shock to the polity index in Egypt. Similar to democracy
response, GDP growth processes in high and upper middle income countries do not respond to
institutional shocks in Egypt. In the meantime, the Egyptian democratic positive shock is likely to
induce growth processes in low and lower income countries. However, these responses appear to be
statistically significant only for the first six years in low income countries and insignificant the case of
lower middle income countries.
Figure 2. Democracy responses to 1-SD positive shock to democracy (polity index) in Egypt.
Figure 3. Growth responses to 1-SD positive shock to democracy in Egypt.
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8. Robustness Checks
Our results in Section 7 show how a positive shock to political settings in Egypt can have spillover
effects on other Arab countries’ political institutions and economic growth. To proxy for political
settings, we use one of the most popular indexes in the literature (i.e., polity index). Yet, measuring the
quality of political institutions and capturing ongoing political reform processes in a given country
is not an easy task. This implies that our results might be driven mainly by our measure of political
settings. To check how sensitive our results are to different measures of the quality political institutions,
we replace our polity index with a recently introduced index for democracy which is proposed
by Gründler and Krieger (2016). The new index, namely the support vector machines democracy
index (SVMDI) which is based on a mathematical algorithm for pattern recognition, is a continuous
measure of institutional settings and takes values from zero to one with a very detailed and sensitive
measurement of democracy. We re-estimate our GVAR model and report the GIRFs below. Our results
did not change significantly when using a different proxy for political settings. Figure 4, which reports
the GIRFs for a 1-SD positive shock in Egypt and responses of the new democracy index by group of
countries, shows there is a positive and statistically significant responses in both low and lower-middle
income countries. This confirms our previous conclusion in that a positive shock to democracy in
Egypt is likely to induce democracy in those groups of countries. The GIRFs in Figure 4 confirm our
conclusion on that the shock would not have a statistically significant impact on democracy in both
high and upper-middle income countries.
Figure 4. Democracy responses to 1-SD positive shock to the support vector machines democracy
index (SVMDI) democracy index in Egypt.
9. Concluding Remarks
We investigate the spillover effect of democratic shocks, and how it may trigger the state of
democracy and economic growth among countries in proximity. We defined ’proximity’ in both
geographic and relational sense. In the specific context of the Arab Spring, we arrived at a number of
important conclusions. We found that there was heterogeneous dynamic interdependence among Arab
countries’ growth processes, and such an interdependence varied measurably as democratic distance
became larger over time. The implication is that Arabic countries, which are affine with respect to
democratic qualities and socio-economic parameters, are very likely to be affected by democratic
shocks. This is confirmed by our GVAR analysis, which finds that (i) high and upper middle income
countries are immune to the recent democratic shock transference; and (ii) the lower middle and low
income countries seem to be perfect candidates for another revolutionary wave.
Our investigation led to shed light on the important issue of transmission of democratic shocks
and its realised impacts on countries classified by their degree of development. We tested this first, by
assuming that countries were interconnected by similarity of democratic quality, where we found a
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strong evidence of spatial interdependence of economic growth processes among Arabian economies.
Both the signs and magnitudes of interdependence were observed to vary measurably; some countries
(viz., Algeria, Sudan, Jordan, and Egypt) display positive growth interdependence as a function of
democratic distance, whereas others (viz., Djibouti, Iraq, Morocco, and Somalia, among others) display
negative interdependence. An important implication of this result is that (positive/negative) shocks to
institutional quality (i.e., in our case, whether countries opting for democracy or autocracy) within the
relation space of countries can demonstrate long-run positive and/or negative spillover effects. This
possibility was then investigated in our work by employing a GVAR framework.
Using this framework, we examined whether the current revolution waves in Egypt were more
likely to transfer to other Arabic countries. Two important results emerged; first, there was a strong
evidence of possible transmission of positive democratic shocks in the case of low and lower-middle
income countries. Second, we found that countries with high level of economic development appeared
to be immune to democratic shocks. Moreover, the full realisation of the positive shock in low
development countries was observed to occur with a lag of about 4 years. A possible explanation
could be that democratic shocks and their transmission are well explained in light of the economic
conditions in the corresponding country. Moreover, countries that showed no response to democratic
shocks in Egypt were found to be those which rely heavily on oil exports. This is in line with Ross
(2001) who show that being an oil-rich economy inflicts a damage to democracy (this is supported by
what is known as rentier effect). In fact, the claim that oil and democracy do not mix is used by many
scholars to explain why high income states of the Arab World have not become democratic. Studies on
Algeria, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf states have all suggested that the government’s oil wealth has blocked
the transition to democracy (Huntington 1993). Our findings contribute to this strand of literature
in concluding that the abundance of oil is not only a prohibitive limit to the path of democratisation
within the country but also has an antidemocratic effect that blocks the transmission of democratic
shocks in the neighbourhood.
Our results give rise to interesting policy implications. Firstly, governments in low and lower
income countries in the Arab World should adopt ‘real’ economic reforms if they wish to neutralise
the spillover effects of democratic shocks in their neighbourhood. Such economic reforms should be
on top of the post-revolution governments agenda. We agree in this regard with (Cheibub et al. 1996)
who demonstrates that democracies in poor countries have significantly better prospects if they can
maintain their economic growth. Secondly, high-performing economies should invest in improving
law and order, social development, and transparency so that they may reverse the negative effects
of the oil ‘curse’ on democracy, and should open the door for a real democratic transition process to
kick off. The reason is that a ‘shock in any form—positive or negative—cannot be bound within a
geographic space. Expansionary social and economic policies can be the best form of collaterals in the
presence of revolutionary waves in the region.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Democratisation Event Chronology.
Transition to Transition to Regime Change Borderline Reverse TransitionDemocracy Autocracy Democratisation Episode
ALGERIA (1962) ALGERIA (1992) Comoros (1990) Lebanon (1975)
ALGERIA (2004) BAHRAIN (1972) ALGERIA (2003)
COMOROS (1990) COMOROS (1976) BAHRAIN (1996)
COMOROS (1996) COMOROS (1995) COMOROS (1998)
COMOROS (2002) COMOROS (1999) DJIBOUTI (1977)
DJIBOUTI (1999) DJIBOUTI (1977) DJIBOUTI (1978)
MAURITANIA (2007) EGYPT (1960) EGYPT (1993)
IRAQ (1960) JORDAN (1970)
JORDAN (1960) JORDAN (1992)
KUWAIT (1963) KUWAIT (1975)
KUWAIT (1991) KUWAIT (1990)
LEBANON (1975) LEBANON (1990)
LIBYA (1960) LIBYA (1962)
MAURITANIA (1960) LIBYA (2004)
MOROCCO (1960) MAURITANIA (1989)
OMAN (1960) MOROCCO (1988)
SOMALIA (2000) MOROCCO (1991)
TUNISIA (1960)
YEMEN (1990)
Note: Year of autocratic or democratic episodes as indicated are in brackets.
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Table A2. Markov transition probabilities for Polity2.
−10 −9 −8 −7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 2 4 5 6 7 8 9
−10 0.928 0.044 0.015 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
−9 0.008 0.919 0.048 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
−8 0.035 0.052 0.845 0.052 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
−7 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.931 0.028 0.000 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
−6 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.915 0.017 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
−5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 0.048 0.714 0.095 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
−4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.067 0.667 0.133 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
−3 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.040 0.760 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
−2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.909 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
−1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.889 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.909 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.636 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.500
7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.867 0.067 0.000
8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.923 0.000
9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Note: The transition probabilities are calculated for all countries as a whole.
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Table A3. Fixed-weight matrix.
ALG BAH COM DJI EGY IRA JOR KUW LEB LIB MAU MOR OMA QAT SAU SOM SUD SYR TUN
ALG 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.35 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07
BAH 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02
COM 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02
DJI 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.48 0.01 0.01 0.02
EGY 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03
IRA 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
JOR 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.03
KUW 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.45 0.59 0.03 0.30 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.33 0.06 0.25 0.03 0.02 0.29 0.03
LEB 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
LIB 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.44
MAU 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01
MOR 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
OMA 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02
QAT 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03
SAU 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.56 0.13 0.18 0.47 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.23 0.68 0.30 0.08
SOM 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
SUD 0.04 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04
SYR 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
TUN 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
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Table A4. Unit-root test statistics for domestic variables at the 5% significance level.
Domestic Critical High Income Low Income Lower Middle Upper Middle
gdp −3.24 −1.11 −1.15 −1.65 −0.67
Dgdp −2.89 −2.93 −3.2 −4.78 −3.77
democ −3.45 −3.05 −2.02 −1.66 −2.55
Ddemoc −2.89 −4.49 −4.92 −3.95 −6.71
openness −3.45 −1.65 −1.66 −1.78 −2.23
Dopenness −2.89 −5.44 −4.5 −6.02 −4.04
school −3.45 −3.24 −0.91 −3.01 −2.71
Dschool −2.89 −2.04 −2.43 −1.95 −1.9
Based on univariate autoregressive specifications, the ADF statistics for the level and first differences of the
variables are all computed on the same sample period, namely, 1960–2012. The ADF statistics for all level
variables are based on regressions including a linear trend. The optimal lag length is determined based on the
akaike information criterion (AIC).
Table A5. Unit-root test statistics for foreign variables at the 5% significance level.
Foreign Critical High Income Low Income Lower Middle Upper Middle
gdp * −3.45 −1.82 −1.68 −0.48 −4.68
Dgdp * −2.89 −4.84 −3.91 −3 −2.98
democ * −3.45 −0.06 * −0.97 −1.24 −0.56
Ddemoc * −2.89 −3.3 −4.07 −5.18 −3.69
openness * −3.45 −2.75 −2.32 −2.51 −2.56
Dopenness * −2.89 −5.16 −3.97 −3.82 −4.85
school * −3.45 −3 −3.04 −3.06 −3.27
Dschool * −2.89 −1.89 −2 −1.94 −1.99
Based on univariate autoregressive specifications, the ADF statistics for the level and first differences of the
variables are all computed on the same sample period, namely, 1960–2012. The ADF statistics for all level
variables are based on regressions including a linear trend. The optimal lag length is determined based on
the akaike information criterion (AIC). Besides, the Unit-Root test statistics for the global variable (i.e., oil
prices) is −0.134 at −3.24 critical value of 95% confidence level. * denotes a foreign variable constructed as in
Equation (3).
Table A6. Order and number of cointegration relationships in the country-specific models.
VARX*
Country pi qi Relationships
high income 2 1 2
low income 2 1 2
lower middle 2 1 2
upper middle 2 1 1
pi and qi are the lag order of domestic and foreign variables in Equation (2). Relationships is the number of
cointegrating vectors in individual country error correction models. VARX* denote a VAR model with weakly
exogenous variables (X*) constructed as in Equation (3).
Table A7. F Statistics for tests of residual serial correlation for region-specific VARX *.
Region F Critical gdp democ Openness School Poil
high income 3.25 0.9 1.48 1.33 1.52 1.57
low income 3.25 2.99 0.58 0.48 1.65
lower middle 3.25 2.12 0.3 0.11 0.18
upper middle 3.24 1.85 0.17 6.27∗ 0.39
* Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level or less.
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Table A8. F Statistics for testing the weak exogeneity of the region-specific foreign variables.
Region F Critical gdp * democ * Openness * School * Poil *
high income 3.28 0.3 0.38 1.09 0.35 1.04
low income 3.28 0.41 0.44 0.19 0.33 1.88
lower middle 3.28 0.45 2.09 0.14 1.33 0.14
upper middle 4.12 1.74 0.81 0.66 0.5 4.14 *
* Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level or less.
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